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PRIMARY JURISDICTION:
THE NEED FOR BETTER COURT/AGENCY INTERACTION
MICHAEL BOTEIN*

The division of responsibility between courts and agencies, generally
considered under the rubric of "primary jurisdiction," is often seen as a
powerful force in shaping the administrative process. But some agencies pay little attention to the doctrines involved and make little attempt
to preserve their jurisdiction from judicial intervention. 1 The interest of
commentators in the doctrines therefore appears somewhat anomalous. 2
Nevertheless, scholarly study has produced an excellent body of writing on the law of primary. jurisdiction. s Precisely because this material
already exists, a further analysis of the often chaotic case law seems
neither fruitful nor appropriate. Instead, after a very brief overview of
the doctrines, this piece will consist of a preliminary study of how the
courts and agencies actually interact, together with methods by which
this interaction can be made more efficient.
+ B.A., 1966, Wesleyan University; J.D., 19,69, Cornell University; LL.M., 1972,
Columbia University; Associate Professor, Rutgers Law School, Newark.
This article is based upon a report prepared by its author under the auspices of the
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS). The Conference, however,
does not in any way approve or evaluate its content, which is the sole responsibility of
the author.
1. See text surrounding notes 126-45 infra.
2. This interest may spring from anyone of several causes. First, the commentators' concern may simply reflect an increasing public awareness of and interest in the
functioning of administrative agencies. Thus, a number of "public interest" groups have
begun to study in detail the functioning of administrative agencies. See, e.g., R.
FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION (1970) (Ralph Nader's study group
on The Interstate Commerce Commission and Transportation) [hereinafter cited as
FELLMETH]. At the same time, the Executive branch has become increasingly concerned about the efficient functioning of the federal agencies. See PRESIDENT'S
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK:.
REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 3-7 (1971). Moreover, as
the nation's economy has become increasingly regulated, Congress has exempted more
and more industries from the operation of the antitrust laws, an area in which the
doctrines have come to playa highly significant role. See, e.g., Hale & Hale, Competition or Control VI: Application of Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries, 111 U. PA. L.
REV. 46, 48-51 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Hale & Hale]. Finally, the federal courts
face increasingly overloaded dockets. See, e.g., Campbell, Delays in Criminal Cases, 55
F.R.D. 229 (1972); Zeisel, Court Delay Caused by the Bar?, 54 A.B.A.J. 886 (1968).
Accordingly, courts may be tempted to reduce congestion by funneling litigation into the
administrative process.
3. For a sampling of the excellent scholarly literature in this area, see notes 4, 7,
14, 17 infra.

867

868
I.

RUTGERS LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 29

THE DocTRINES AND THEIR DIFFICULTIES:
A BRIEF OVERVIEW

The law of primary jurisdiction exists in a highly uncertain state today.
Indeed, some observers4 have suggested that there really is no coherent
law at all. This situation could arise only in a country like the United
States which had developed the administrative process into a fine and
artificial art. ~ The development of the various related doctrines naturally tracks the development of the federal administrative agencies; as
agencies grew in number and importance, their jurisdiction and potential conflicts with courts also increased. It is necessary to review the
doctrines briefly, in order to clarify some of the problems facing courts
and agencies.
"Primary jurisdiction" actually includes at least four major doctrines: primary exclusive jurisdiction, true primary jurisdiction, statutory exemptions, and agency immunizations. 6 Under primary exclusive jurisdiction, a court loses all power over a case, except the very
limited ability to review any ensuing agency action. On the other hand,
true primary jurisdiction gives an agency the initial opportunity to
consider a legal issue or to find facts, but reserves for the court the
ultimate power to render a judgment. 7
A statutory exemption is simply a congressional act which bars
specific causes of action against particular industries, most commonly
under the antitrust laws. 8 An agency immunization has virtually the
same effect of removing potential liability, but is not self-executing and
must be secured from an agency.9 Statutory exemptions and agency
immunizations thus are quite similar in terms of both policy and impact.
As will be seen, statutory exemptions and agency immunizations in fact
share a number of common features and often overlap.l0
4. See Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1037, 1038-41 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Jaffe]; Kestenbaum, Primary Jurisdiction to Decide Antitrust Jurisdiction:
A Practical Approach to the Allocation of Functions, 55 GEO. L.J. 812, 818-23 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Kestenbaum].
5. A former prominent official in the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department
thus recently commented-perhaps tongue-in-cheek-that the regulatory agency "is a
unique American contribution to the history of public institutions." Baker, Competition
and Regulation: Charles River Bridge Recrossed, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 159, 161 (1975).
6. To a certain extent, this analysis tracks that of McGovern, Types of Questions
Over Which Administrative Agencies Do Not Have Primary Jurisdiction, 13 ABA
ANTITRUST SECIlON 57,61 (1958) [hereinafter cited as McGovern].
7. See text accompanying notes 51-58 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 24-31 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 37-50 infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 25-63 infra. This analysis does not include, of
course, the problem of federal preemption of state court action or the converse question
of the extent to which state legislation can immunize conduct from the antitrust laws
under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The latter issue is extremely important,
since it functions very much like an express federal statutory exemption or administrative
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Primary Exclusive Jurisdiction

The original statement of "primary jurisdiction"-really primary exclusive jurisdiction-came in the context of protecting ICC tariffs from
scattergun collateral attacks in state courts. Primary exclusive jurisdiction thus developed for purposes far' different than its most common
application today as a defense in antitrust actions.l1
The putative parent of the doctrine is Texas & Pacific Railway v.
Abilene Cotton Oil CoP In fact, the Court there held only that an
aggrieved shipper could not challenge in state court the validity of a
railroad's tariff filing with the Interstate Commerce Commission, but
instead had to commence a proceeding before the Commission. The
Court reasoned that individual recoveries would permit de facto rebates
to some shippers, encourage collusive lawsuits to give rebates, and thus
create a lack of "uniformity" in rates. 1S
Abilene has received numerous criticisms, which need not be repeated
here. 14 Perhaps most important today, however, is that the doctrine
was created to control private law contractual disputes, but now functions mainly in the context of public law antitrust cases. Moreover, the
immunization. Its dimensions, however, take it beyond the scope of this piece. For an
excellent discussion of the problems in this area, see Handler, The Current Attack on the
Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. I (1976).
11. As noted above, primary exclusive jurisdiction is closely related to true primary
jurisdiction. The following analysis separates the two concepts, however, in order to put
them in an appropriate historical context.
12. 204 U.S. 426 (1907). The Abilene debate had been foreshadowed in one of the
Court's first decisions under the Sherman Act. In United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), a case usually cited for its adoption of "per
se" standards for price-fixing arrangements, the Court concluded after a lengthy discussion that the mere existence of the Interstate Commerce Commisssion did not immunize
from the antitrust laws railroads which filed tariffs with it. Id. at 314-27. Interestingly
enough, the four dissenting justices argued that merely filing a tariff with the Commission immunized all actions under it from the antitrust laws. Id. at 343, 363-69. (White,
Field, Gray & Shiras, n., dissenting).
13. See 204 U.S. at 440-46. In a companion case, the Court held that failure to post
rate schedules, in violation of the Act, did not vitiate the Abilene principle. Texas &
Pac. Ry. v. Cisco Oil Mill, 204 U.S. 449 (1907).
14. The Court reached its decision not because the issues required it, but rather
because it unilaterally decided to do so. The Court thus ignored several major procedural objections, 204 U.S. at 434-35, and pushed on to decide a point which had been
neither briefed nor argued. See von Mehren, .The Antitrust Laws and Regulated
Industries: The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, 67 HARv. L. REV. 929, 932-33 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as von Mehrenl. Moreover, the Court's great emphasis on "uniformity" may have been misplaced, for the possibility of many inconsistent results probably
was quite remote. C/. Convisser, Primary Jurisdiction: The Rule and Its Rationalizations, 65 YALE L.J. 315, 322-25 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Convisser]. Similarly,
collusive lawsuits would have been a rather expensive and complicated way for railroads
to give de facto rebates to favored customers. Some commentators thus have characterized Abilene as a blatant exercise in judicial legislation. See, e.g., Schwartz, Primary
Administrative Jurisdiction and the Exhaustion 0/ Litigants, 41 GEO. LJ. 495, 497
(1953) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz, Primary Jurisdiction].
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Court's fears of inconsistent results in Abilene may have made sense in
1907 but are less valid today. The modern class action, despite recently
imposed limitations,15 provides uniform treatment for similarly situated
parties. A properly supervised class action thus would give as much
uniformity as would the ICC, and also preserve judidal jurisdictionY
The Court soon expanded the ICC's primary exclusive jurisdiction
beyond tariffsY And the Court later held Abilene required primary
exclusive ICC jurisdiction over motor carriers as well as rail carriers. 18
Moreover, as the Court expanded the scope of the ICC's primary exclusive jurisdiction, it also created several exceptions to it-some of which
have continuing vitality today. First, the Court did not find primary
exclusive jurisdiction where an action challenged conduct which the
ICC could not regulate. l9 The Court also allowed actions against
15. The strict notice requirements on class actions imposed by Eisen v. Carlisle &
lacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), would not seem to be difficult to meet in a case such as
Abilene. The potential litigants in Abilene were few in number and readily identifiable
by company records. Eisen requirements might not be met in suits involving potentiaIly
large, unidentified groups of litigants, as in suits involving the FCC and SEC. The mOre
difficult hurdle naturally would be establishing that each class member had suffered at
least $10,000 damages required under Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291
(1973 ).
16. Furthermore, the nature of the railroad industry has changed fundamentally
since 1907. Because of competition from motor trucks and the effect of World War II,
the railroad industry has lost its natural monopoly status and therefore may need less
intensive regulation. ct. Phillips, Railroad Mergers: Competition, Monopoly, and
Antitrust, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REV. I, 15-17 (1962). The Court conveniently overlooked
this consideration when it applied Abilene to suits against motor carriers. See generally,
T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 468-80 (1959). Congress thus probably
could have abolished the ICC and allowed competition as well as class actions to control
railroad charges.
17. In Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. United States ex reI. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215
U.S. 431 (1910), the Court held that the ICC had exclusive jurisdiction over a railroad's
allocation of cars to coal companies, even though the carrier had not filed its regulations
with the Commission in the first place. See also Jaffe, Primary lurisdiction Reconsidered; The Anti-Trust Laws, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 577, 582-83 (1954). This position
seems questionable at best. If a carrier's practice is not before the ICC by way of a
tariff filing, the Commission can act only by way of an affirmative investigation-a
practice of which it is not terribly fond. See FELLMETH, supra note 2, at 11-13. To a
certain extent, the Pitcairn Court may have been influenced by the fact that the ICC in
fact had undertaken an investigation. See 215 U.S; at 494-95. Nevertheless, the
possibility that an agency may act should not give it exclusive jurisdiction automatically.
18. See T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959). Four justices dissented
on the ground that the ICC did not have as appropriate remedies for motor shippers
as for rail shippers. Id. at 481-84 (Black, Douglas, Warren, and Clark, JJ., dissenting).
But see Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84, 88-89 (1962)
(Court seemed to indicate that the ICC has only primary as opposed to exclusive jurisdiction over motor carriers).
19. The Court was somewhat unclear as to whether this exception covered conduct
which the Commission did not regulate or only conduct which the Commission could not
regulate. In United States v. Pacific & Arctic Railway & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87,
103-05 (1913), the Court allowed the Justice Department to bring an antitrust suit based
on a conspiracy which ultimately resulted in the fixing of prices in tariffs filed with the
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conduct violative of the ICC's regulations, as opposed to attacks on the
validity of the regulations. 20 Furthermore, the Court at one time recognized an exception for some pure "common law" right&.21 Finally, the
Court vacillated in applying primary exclusive jurisdiction to cases
which involved judicial "construction" of tariffs 22 or statutes. 23
There is clearly a need for doctrines to adjust tensions between
courts and agencies, but the doctrine of primary exclusive jurisdiction is
riddled with exceptions and about as forgiving to litigants as Attila the
Hun. Although there appear to be no immediate solutions, it is at least
possible to approach the problem more analytically, as suggested in
Section II.
ICC. The Court seemed to reason that government could attack conduct which led to
the tariff, as opposed to the tariff itself. See also Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324
U.S. 439 (1945). But in Midland Valley Railroad v. Barkley, 276 U.S. 482 (1928), the
Court held that the ICC's failure to act in a given area where it clearly had jurisdiction
precluded private lawsuits. This apparent distinction between inability and disinclination
to regulate seems a bit anomalous, since both produce the same result. Moreover,
allowing court action where an agency fails to act need not prejudice the agency. A
court presumably will defer to an agency's exercise of a previously dormant power.
20. See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. Puritan Coal Mining Co., 237 U.S. 121, 131-32
(1915); Pennsylvania R.R. v. International Coal Mining Co., 239 U.S. 184, 196-97
(1913). Although perfectly reasonable under Abilene's notion of "uniformity," this
approach clearly was inconsistent with the later theory of "expertise," since it deprived
the ICC of a chance to apply its supposedly specialized skills to the meaning of its own
regulations. See text accompanying notes 66-69 infra.
The lower federal courts later-and perfectly logically~xtended this principle to
violations of agency authorizations. See, e.g., World Airways, Inc. v. Northeast Airlines,
Inc., 349 F.2d 1007, 1011 (1st Cir. 1965); CAB v. Modern Air Transport, Inc., 179 F.2d
622, 624-25 (2d Cir. 1950). This type of holding appears related to the notion that
exclusive jurisdiction does not exist where the agency itself is the plaintiff in a suit.
21. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sonman Shaft Co., 242 U.S. 120, 125-26 (1916); Eastern
Ry. of N.M. v. Littlefield, 237 U.S. 140, 144-45 (1915).
22. At first, the Court consistently seemed to reject this type of exception, on the
theory that an apparently simple question of tariff construction actually might involve
complex issues of economics and technology. Loomis v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 240 U.S.
43 (1916); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. American Tie & Timber Co., 234 U.S. 138 (1914). But
just a few years after these cases, the Court decided that the meaning of a tariff raised an
issue which was "solely one of construction . . . . " Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 294 (1922). When the Court later cut down on the
scope of the exception in United States v. Western Pacific Railroad, 352 U.S. 59 (1956),
the ICC on remand applied precisely the same general type of standards in construing
the tariff as a court would have. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION 130 (1965).
23. In International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233, 23839 (1971), the Court held that the question of whether a union member had received a
fair hearing under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act was within
judicial competence and that the NLRB had no superior competence.
There seems to be more support for this position than the position on tariffs. See note
22 supra. While an agency may have some expertise in construing regulations promulgated by it or tariffs approved by it, the judiciary has the final authority to give an
authoritative construction to a statute. For an unusual variation on this theme, see
Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192-94 (1969).
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Statutory Exemptions and Agency Immunizations

The most difficult issues in this area arise in the context of antitrust
suits, for the theories behind regulation and antitrust are naturally
antithetical: regulation emphasizes governmental control of business;
antitrust relies on the market place. Although the basic regulatory and
antitrust schemes evolved at roughly the same time toward the end of
the nineteenth century,24 the Court has recognized very properly that
they represent "two regimes. "211 Professor Handler thus has noted that
the "two basic questions" in this area are "what particular mix of
competition and regulation is best calculated to serve the public interest
in connection with any given business activity . . ." and "how this
detennination should be made in any given instance."26 Section II
addresses itself primarily to this second question. Since administrative
agencies often apply anticompetitive standards, statutory exemptions
and agency immunizations may result in approval of anticompetitive
conduct;27 every such decision is thus at least potentially anticompetitive. 28
Some observers believe that competition essentially is dead in this
country and that the nation thus simply should accept increased regulation of industry. 29 Other observers have more faith in the future of
competition, however, and thus oppose the potentially anticompetitive
effects of exclusive agency jurisdiction. so Indeed, the commentators
have appeared diametrically opposed as to whether regulation or competition is to be preferred. St
The easiest cases naturally are those in which the status of an agency's
immunization power, and an industry's statutory exemption, are clear.
When a court finds that an agency could not conceivably immunize a
24. King, The "Arguably Lawful" Test of Primary Jurisdiction in Antitrust Litigation Involving Regulated Industries, 40 TENN. L. REV. 617, 617 & n.l (1973) [hereinafter cited as King].
25. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 310 (1963).
26. Handler, Regulation Versus Competition, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 191, 194 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Handler]. Professor Handler would leave the task of answering the
second question to the Congress--a perhaps overly optimistic solution.
27. In Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973), for
example, the Court held that the CAB had immunized conduct otherwise violative of the
antitrust laws by approving it.
28. For a discussion of the outcome-determinative nature of such assertions of
exclusive jurisdiction, see Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated
Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARv. L. REV. 436, 464-75
(1954) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz, Legal Restriction].
29. Cf., e.g., Stokes, A Few Irreverent Comments About Antitrust, Agency Jurisdiction, and Primary Jurisdiction, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 529, 537-39 (1964).
30. See, e.g., Jacobs, Introductory Comments, 20 FED. B.J. 4, 4-5 (1960); Schwartz,
Legal Restriction, supra note 28, at 471-75.
31. Cf. Hale & Hale, supra note 2, at 51-52; Schwartz, Legal Restriction, supra note
28 at 437-38.
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violation of the antitrust laws, the court need not consider whether the
agency must pass on the conduct. 32 Conversely, many industries operate under express statutory exemptions from the antitrust laws. ss The
existence of an exemption thus creates a legal situation very similar to
primary exclusive jurisdiction; the jurisdiction of the courts is effectively
destroyed and all control of the industry is vested in an agency.34
The situation becomes infinitely more complicated, however, either
where the scope of an exemption is unclear or where an implied exemption may exist. Congress is often deliberately or carelessly vague in its
language. 311 Accordingly, the statutes behind possible exemptions are
usually quite cryptic: 86
In this area of comparatively free decision, the courts have established
virtually no standards at all. To be sure, even A bilene started from a
presumption against implied repeals 37-a notion to which the Court
consistently has given only lip service. 38 Beyond this obviously genera]
statement, however, the Court has developed few or no real standards in
the course of making decisions regarding implied repeals. To be sure, it
occasionally has suggested that immunization power should tum on
whether an agency's regulatory scheme is sufficiently "pervasive." But
the Court has vacillated in using even this general test, applying or
ignoring it as it has wished to retain or relinquish judicial jurisdiction. 39
32. See Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458,
464-71 (1960); United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196,204-06
(1945). In both cases the Court held that although the defendants might claim a limited
form of antitrust immunity to legitimize the creation of their otherwise illegal cartels,
Congress had meant to immunize acts with illegal purposes.
33. Walden, Antitrust in the Positive State, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 741, 767-88 (1963),
devotes more than twenty pages to listing the staggering number of special exemptions
which private interest groups have obtained from Congress. As his laundry list
effectively demonstrates, there is no particularly consistent or coherent pattern to the
granting of exemptions.
34. Note, Antitrust Immunity in the Communications Industries, 44 VA. L. REV.
1131, 1132 (1958), views statutory exemptions and agency immunization power as
different from and "supplemented by" the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. As noted
before, regulation and competition usually exist as alternatives. See text accompanying
notes 24-31 supra. Accordingly, some form of administrative structure almost invariably
goes along with the grant of an express exemption. See, e.g., United States v. Borden
Co., 308 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1939).
35. Congress generally obfuscates administrative enabling statutes, simply because it
may have absolutely no idea of how to handle a problem and thus wishes to dump it-as
well as any resulting political flak-into the lap of a comfortably removed administrative
agency. For an excellent example of how Congress ended in total futility when
attempting to allocate radio frequencies around the country, see W. JONES, LICENSING OF
MAJOR BROADCAST FACILITIES BY TIlE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 4
(1962).
36. C/. Comment, Antitrust and the Regulated Industries: The Panagra Decision
.
and Its Ramifications, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 593, 595-98 (1963).
37. See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 436-37 (1907).
38. Cf., e.g., United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939).
39. In United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 348-51 (1959), the
Court held that the Federal Communications Commission's activities in licensing televi-
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The cases 40 indicate that the Court tends to look to an agency's
effectiveness in protecting some public interest other than competition.
Although the Court has deliberately eschewed dealing in these terms
explicitly,H its use of this standard has been apparent. 42 This obviously
sion broadcasters did not constitute a "pervasive regulatory scheme," on the grounds that
the Commission controlled only limited aspects of licensees' operation and left them
considerable discretion in the conduct of day-to-day activities. See also United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'! Bank, 374 U.S. 321,350-52 (1963).
40. For example, in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963), the
Court held that an Exchange ruling against member firms having direct telephone lines
with nonmember firms was not immunized from the antitrust laws. The Court went
through the usual litany of emphasizing the role of the Securities and Exchange
Commission in policing stock exchanges. But it held that the Exchange had failed to
give valid reasons for its failure to hold a hearing. See id. at 361-63. The Court
appeared to be concerned more with due process than with immunization, as not only the
dissent, see id. at 367-69 (Stewart & Harlan, JJ., dissenting), but also other observers
pointed out. Ct. Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. American Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935,
941-43 (5th Cir. 1971) (issue of whether plaintiff had received fair hearing before
delisting of its stock dealt with in pure procedural due process terms).
It thus came as less than a surprise when just ten years later the Court appeared to
tum ninety degrees. In Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U.S. 289 (1973),
the Court held that the Commodity Exchange Commission had a form of true primaryas opposed to primary exclusive-jurisdiction to review the Mercantile Exchange's
transfer of a membership without hearing, noting that:
This judgment [to stay the action] rests on three related premises: (1) that it
will be essential for the antitrust court to determine whether the Commodity
Exchange Act or any of its provisions are "incompatible with the maintenance
of an antitrust action" . . . ; (2) that some facets of the dispute between Ricci
and the Exchange are within the statutory jurisdiction of the Commodity Exchange Commission; and (3) that adjudication of that dispute by the Commission promises to be of material aid in resolving the immunity question. Id.
at 302.
The Court distinguished Silver on the grounds that the statute arguably immunized the
Mercantile Exchange's conduct and that the CEC had a stronger duty than the SEC to
supervise membership in exchanges. See id. at 303-06.
The Ricci decision may very well make sense because of the difference between the
SEC and the CEC. The Court may have recognized that the latter commission
supervised the exchanges' activities more closely. But ct. Note, 33 OHIO STATE LJ. 209,
216-17 (1972). Nevertheless, the Court's suggestion that the statute might immunize
the activities of commodities exchanges seems inconsistent with its treatment of the case
as one involving true primary jurisdiction, and thus appropriate for a stay rather than a
dismissal. See 409 U.S. at 302.
The Court turned another ninety degrees away from Silver in Gordon v. New York
Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659 (1975), where it held that the Exchange's now defunct
rate-setting was immune from the antitrust laws. The Court ostensibly based its holding
just on the fact that the SEC had clear, direct, and effective statutory authority over the
Exchange's rate practices. Indeed, the Court went to great lengths at the end of its
opinion to state that it was not considering the existence of "pervasive" jurisdiction, but
only whether the SEC had the requisite statutory power. See id. at 688-89. Justice
Douglas, however, concurred solely on the grounds that the SEC had done an effective
job of regulation .. Id. at 691-96.
The Court as a whole was nevertheless highly concerned with the history of the
Exchange's rate practices and the rigor of the SEC's regulation. See id. at 668-82. The
Court thus spent the major part of its opinion exploring the history of Exchange
practices and SEC regulation.
41. See, e.g., id. at 689-90.
42. See note 40 supra. The Court apparently found effective regulation lacking in
Silver, arguable in Ricci, and present in Gordon.
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creates a certain amount of ad hoc and unpredictable decisionmaking.
As Section II suggests, however, this may be not only inevitable, but
also desirable.
The Court thus has not produced any clear and consistent standards
for finding immunization power. To be sure, a number of commentators seem little more convinced about their own tests than the Court's.43
Indeed, perhaps the most honest recommendation is simply that the
Court recognize that every immunization issue requires an almost ad hoc
approach.44
Even when an agency definitely does have power to immunize con. duct, it often is unclear whether an agency has taken enough action to
invoke its immunization power for a particular firm. The Court thus
has held that an agency's approval of contracts between regulated
industries invoked immunization--<lespite the agency's plea that the
Court apply the antitrust laws. 45 The Court thus was in the position of
forcing more oversight of anticompetitive conduct down an agency's
throat.
Finally, it is unclear whether an agency may immunize retroactively
conduct which has not been brought to its attention by means of tariff or
other filings. Indeed, the Court has wavered on the issue and made
apparently contradictory statements. 46 On the one hand, a requirement
of prior approval may make sense; after all, failure to file shows a
disrespect for law and the agency conceivably might disapprove the
filing.47 On the other hand, a filing requirement may be formalistic,
43. McGovern proposes that courts look to whether there is a need for special
administrative expertise and uniformity. He limits this obviously rather general recommendation with the comment-hopefully tongue-in-cheek-that his test is "nothing more
finite than a pragmatic, working test as a criterion for the application of the doctrine."
McGovern, supra note 7, at 67. On the other hand, Con visser suggests that the courts
look solely to whether judicial intervention would interfere with agency operations-also
a general standard. See Convisser, supra note 14, at 336-37. Perhaps most interesting
of all, Hale & Hale develop a "mushroom principle," under which an agency would have
exclusive jurisdiction over everything which it potentially might need to regulate in the
future. Hale & Hale, supra note 2, at 57-58.
44. See Fox, The Antitrust Laws and Regulated Industries: A Reappraisal of the
Role of the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine, 2 MEMPHIS STATE L. REV. 296, 297 (1972).
45. See Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973).
The CAB had made its request by way of an amicus brief. Id. at 409 (Burger &
BIackmun, 11., dissenting). The reasons for the CAB's disavowal of this very substantial
chunk of power were less than clear. The Board apparently feared that a holding like
the majority's, however, would force it to use excessive care, which it felt it could not
exercise with its present staff. Interview with member of Office of General Counsel,
Civil Aeronautics Board, in Washington, D.C., February 24, 1975 [hereinafter cited as
CAB Interview].
46. Compare Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conf., 282 U.S. 213, 215 (1966)
with Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S.
62,69 (1970).
47. See Fulda, A Critique of the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, 13 ABA
ANTITRUST SECTION 68, 72-73 (1958).
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since an agency immunization may terminate antitrust liability.48
A decision in favor of immunization power thus has a powerful
impact upon the parties to a law suit. Immunization effectively may
destroy a plaintiff's cause of action. If it has the requisite power, the
agency often will immunize the conduct. Commentators have recognized the outcome-determinative effect of agency immunization for a
long time,4\1 and even the Court has appeared to note this. 50

C.

True Primary Jurisdiction and Referrals

Despite the doctrines of primary exclusive jurisdiction, statutory exemptions, and agency immunizations, this country's judicial system
always has allowed a certain amount of concurrent jurisdiction between
courts and agencies. 51 Indeed, the United States legal system not only
permits but also encourages concurrent jurisdiction in some situations,
as between the NLRB and the federal courts. 52 True "primary jurisdiction" thus exists only where there is concurrent jurisdiction. In this
situation, the question is which tribunal will proceed first, rather than
which tribunal will proceed. 53 To be sure, primary jurisdiction has
some impact upon the outcome of a case; after all, if an agency uses its
"expertise" to find facts, review under the substantial evidence rule will
restrict a court's role greatly. 54 A court may well be able to refer a case
in such a way, however, as to preserve unlimited review powers.5t\
The seminal as well as most illustrative case of true primary jurisdiction is General American Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal CO.56
The shipper there brought a simple action for breach of contract,
claiming that under the contract the carrier owed it all rebates received
from railroads for shipping the plaintiff's products. The defendant
argued that it could not pass along such rebates under the Interstate
Commerce Act. The Court quickly went to the merits and held that the
plaintiff was entitled under the contract to the rebates. However, it
48. See King, supra note 24, at 631.
49. Convisser, supra note 14, at 330-31; see Kestenbaum, supra note 4, at 814.
Moreover, just giving the agency the power to find the facts in a case under a theory of
primary jurisdiction gives the agency a good deal of power, since on judicial review-as
opposed to a de novo trial-a court is much more restricted in its ability to make
findings of fact. See also von Mehren, supra note 14, at 960-65.
50. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353-54 (1963).
51. See Jaffe, supra note 4, at 1053-54.
52. See Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HARV. L.
REV. 529, 547-48 (1963).
53. See Comment, New Twists on Old Wrinkles: Primary Jurisdiction and Regulatory Accommodation with the Antitrust Laws, 15 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 80, 93-94
(1971).
54. See von Mehren, supra note 14, at 946-47.
55. See text accompanying note 124 infra.
56. 308 U.S. 422 (1940).
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decided to stay the proceeding and retain jurisdiction in order to give the
ICC a chance to decide whether the rebates were legal in the first
place. 57 The El Dorado holding thus creates a situation very different
from primary exclusive jurisdiction. In an exclusive jurisdiction situation, the court's only role is to subject the agency decision to very limited
substantive review, while in the true primary jurisdiction situation the
court retains jurisdiction over the case and uses the agency decision as
just one component in its own decision. The plaintiff thus retains its
right to a judicial remedy, subject only to a possibly binding decision
from the relevant agency.58
Primary jurisdiction does have its own problems. It is not clear how
closely an issue must be related to administrative expertise before a
court should order a referral. 59 A fair reading of El Dorado indicates
that the administrative issue need not be closely related to the lawsuit,
however, since the ICC rulings there were relevant only to the legality of
a part of a purely private contract. 60 Similarly, there is no statutory or
administrative procedure for making a referral in an El Dorado situation. 6i Accordingly, a more definite procedure for making these referrals certainly would be useful. 62
The El Dorado fonn of true primary jurisdiction promotes an easy
relationship between courts, agencies, and litigants. Instead of producing the harsh result of outright dismissal, it merely stays the action until
the agency has been heard.
57. See id. at 431-33. The Court thus did not divest the jurisdiction of the district
court, but only required that the court wait for the ICC determination before making any
final decision.
58. Schwartz, Primary Jurisdiction, supra note 14, at 500-03, criticizes the practice
of splitting up issues between court and agency, arguing instead that the court should
decide the whole case. Although this might well be beneficial in terms of securing a
speedier decision, the El Dorado formulation gives the court the benefit of a supposedly
expert opinion and should not consume an undue amount of time unless the agency
deliberately drags its feet.
59. See McGovern, supra note 7, at 66.
60. Indeed, to the extent that referral is based upon a desire to receive an agency's
supposed "expertise," a close relation may not be necessary at all. See, e.g., Quigley v.
Exxon Co., 34 AD. L.2d 891 (M.D. Pa., May 10, 1974).
61. See Ailes, Some Procedural Problems of Primary Jurisdiction, 13 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 82, 84-85 (1958).
62. See id. at 89-91. Ailes sets forth a model order of referral, specifying the issues
on which the agency should pass. Issuance of such an order is no guarantee of agency
action, however, since agencies have been known simply to turn up their noses at courts.
See McQuade Tours, Inc., 50 C.A.B. 910 (1969). Nevertheless, this type of behavior
appears to be quite rare, to say the least. As one agency attorney quite realistically
pointed out, an agency does not like to offend a judge "particularly if a lot of our own
litigation is pending there." Interview with member of Office of General Counsel,
Securities & Exchange Commission, in Washington, D.C., December 4, 1974 [hereinafter
cited as SEC].
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AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR
JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING

As the preceding discussion indicates, the jargon of "primary jurisdiction" actually lumps together many separate doctrines. In order to
develop any useful conceptual model of judicial versus agency jurisdiction, it therefore is essential to separate the radically different decisionmaking situations which fall under the "primary jurisdiction" rubric. As
noted in Section I, the four most common situations are statutory
exemption, immunization by agency order, primary exclusive jurisdiction, and true primary jurisdiction. The latter two situations obviously
have the most in common as well as the greatest resemblance to traditional notions of primary jurisdiction; but there is considerable interplay
among all four theories.
In each situation, two main considerations are relevant: first, the
appropriateness of judicial versus agency action, and, second, the specific factual context of the situation. Tension often exists among the
various factors which comprise the two main considerations. Furthermore, although judicial action may appear perfectly appropriate, a
particular situation may present countervailing considerations, such as a
very explicit statutory exemption, agency immunization of the conduct
in issue, or specific jurisdictional requirements.
To be sure, improved judicial decisionmaking may not be the key to
resolving fundamental tensions between regulation and competition,
agencies and courts. Indeed, Professor Handler has broken from other
commentators in suggesting that the answer lies with Congress through
a thorough-going reevaluation and redefinition of present statutes. 63 But
although this type of clear-cut and definitive answer is attractive, it does
not appear to be forthcoming in light of Congress' past lack of success
in expeditious and thoughtful action. 'Moreover, under even a new
statutory scheme the courts would retain ultimate responsibility for
filling in gaps and dealing with unforeseen situations.
A.

Appropriateness of Judicial Versus Agency Action

The first consideration is the relationship between agency and judicial
action. To be sure, this is a very general and perhaps speciously
overbroad concept. Indeed, too many commentators fall into the trap
of attempting to construct a unified field theory for all court-agency
relations. But the doctrines discussed in Section I are general by nature,
and a broad discussion of the judicial role is therefore valid, so long as it
also considers more specific issues.
There are many possible justifications for judicial deference to administrative agencies. Some rationales may be questionable, however, and
63. See Handler, supra note 26, at 204-06.
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all vary in weight from situation to situation.
Perhaps the major bar to accurate analysis is simply that "primary
jurisdiction" developed in 1907 for one purpose, but now serves totally
different ones. Although the Abilene Court ostensibly was attempting
to protect the rights of shippers as a class, it probab~y was more concerned with insulating the then young ICC from other courts' encroachment. After all, the ICC as well as the administrative process
was comparatively new and unpopular with some political groups.64
Indeed, by contemporary standards the early ICC was an extraordinarily
aggressive agency65 and ,thus easily made enemies. But the ghosts of antiagency bias have long since evaporated. To a very real extent, the
courts thus use primary jurisdiction to protect agencies against nonexistent dangers.
The most common and perhaps most questionable justification for
judicial deference is that agencies develop special "expertise" which
generalist judges presumably never can duplicate. 66 To be sure, a case
should go to the forum which can deal with it most competently. But
the much vaunted theory of agency expertise has become increasingly
questionable for several reasons. Agency members come and go too
quickly to develop much specialized knowledge. 67 Too many permanent and high level staffers may have only limited competence, simply
because the private sector attracts the best and brightest. 68 Moreover,
an agency's alleged "expertise" often consists of outdated gut reactions,
rather than up-to-date empirical studies. 69 Finally, and most significantly, the courts have become increasingly restive with post-New Deal
restrictions on judicial review. Some federal judges-particularly in the
District of Columbia Circuit-have lived with agencies long enough to
know and, occasionally, even articulate their deficiencies. 70 Judges
know when an agency has been "captured" by the industry or industries
64. See Schwartz, Legal Restriction, supra note 28, at 471.
65. For an illustration, see Judge Friendly's contrast of early versus current ICC
attitudes. H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR
BErrER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 27-35 (1962). See also Jaffe, Primary lurisdiction
Reconsidered: The Anti-Trust Laws, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 577 (1954), who maintains that
the courts now are attempting to "repent their sins" from pre-New Deal days.
66. The theory of administrative expertise did not enter the law, of course, until
well after Abilene and other early cases initially had developed the concept of primary
exclusive jurisdiction. See Jaffe, supra note 4, at 1041-43.
67. See Hector, Problems 0/ the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions,
69 YALE L.J. 931, 957 (1960).
68. See Schwartz, Legal Restriction, supra note 28, at 473-74.
69. Ct. FELLMETH, supra note 2, at 13-15. Indeed, all too often an agency's only
hard information will consist of studies compiled by the very firms which the agency is
charged with regulating, as a perusal of almost any major rulemaking docket will indicate
quickly.
70. See, e.g., Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994, 1000-06 (D.C. Cir. 1966). After all, judges in and around the District of
Columbia have the opportunity for frequent and substantial social and professional
contact with high level agency personnel.
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which it has been charged to regulate 71 and thus accord less deference
to these agencies. Indeed, some courts may have embarked upon a
mission to rescue "captured" agencies by imposing the courts' conceptions of the public interest on them. If the courts are willing to
restructure a prison's day-to-day activities,72 they presumably should
find little difficulty in reviewing an agency's more visible actions.
Expertise thus has become an increasingly weak reed upon which to
rest agency jurisdiction, especially as to captured agencies. To be sure,
agencies usually are the best qualified forums to pass on the conduct of
firms which they police. But expertise should not keep any talismanic
qUality. Instead, a court should use the procedures discussed in Section
TIF3 to discover whether an agency has real competence in a particular
case.
A second rationale for agency jurisdiction, and Abilene's ostensible
basis, is that court adjudication of individual disputes prevents "uniformity" in the treatment of a whole class. But Abilene probably was
unfounded in its fear that individual and possible collusive actions
would give some shippers de facto preferences over others, since only
some shippers would recover. To be sure, national uniformity in policy-as opposed to individual case results-may be valuable to facilitate
commercial and other transactions. As will be noted later,74 however,
this consideration is quite different from the theory of uniformity underlying agency jurisdiction.
Another possible justification for judicial deference is that agencies
deliver speedier justice than courts. After all, one of the traditional
reasons for creating agencies has been to expedite proceedings. 75 To be
sure, some federal agencies perform the vital function of processing
millions of comparatively small matters very efficiently. But any major
adjudication is likely to proceed as torturously before an agency as
before a court. An agency must decide whether to order a hearing in
the first place78-a process which by itself can take three or four years. 77
71. Ct. id. at 1003-04, 1008.
72. Bazelon, Implemellting the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 742, 743-44
(1969), turns this argument around in maintaining that courts can intervene in prison
administration because of their past success in dealing with federal agencies.
73. See text surrounding notes 146-62 infra.
74. See text accompanying notes 91-99 infra.
75. See, e.g., I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISB 39 (1958). In more
recent years, however, Professor Davis appears to have become somewhat alarmed at the
very speediness of some high volume agencies' low visibility decisionmaking. See K.
DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICB-A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 27-28 (1969).
76. For example, 47 U.S.C. § 312(c) (1970) requires a complainant to persuade the
Federal Communications Commission to issue a show cause order before even beginning
a proceeding-a procedure common to most other agency statutes with cease and desist
order provisions. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 45(b) (1970). Thus an aggrieved party in effect
must win a motion for summary judgment in order to get a hearing-precisely the
converse of traditional judicial procedure.
77. For example, the FCC currently is more than three years behind in deciding
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Thus, an additional decisional process is interposed before a case even
goes to hearing. In addition, if a hearing is designated, an agency may
not conduct it more expeditiously than a court. Despite recent attempts
to upgrade their status,78 most administrative law judges still are not as
qualified as most federal district court judges. Moreover, evidentiary
and procedural rules are often the same in an agency as in a federal
district court,79 thus creating the same potential delay as in a court.
Thus administrative justice is not necessarily speedy. Indeed, the generation-long, Dickensian nature of some jurisdictional litigation often is
partially the result of delay at the administrative as well as judicial
level. 80 A general theory of administrative speed or efficiency therefore
is not a sound basis on which a court should defer. Instead, a court
should look to an agency's demonstrated competence in handling particular types of issues or cases.
A fourth rationale might be that judicial action creates a conflict with
another branch of the federal government, whether Congress, the Executive, or the "headless fourth branch."81 If this conflict existed, it
would be far more dangerous than the analogous struggle between law
and equity.82 After all, disputes within one branch are presumably less
disruptive than those between branches.
But although judicial action may create some conflict with agencies,
it does not rise to the quasi-constitutional level of a "political question."
Judicial action simply does not create the dangers with which the political question doctrine is concerned. Agency jurisdiction comes from
Congress, not from any direct constitutional source, and courts generally
have "judicially discoverable and manageable standards" for resolving
the questions at issue. Very few cases involve "an initial policy
determination" which the courts cannot make. Moreover, judicial action does not express any "lack of respect due coordinate branches,"
usually does not interfere with any "political decision," and practically
never creates conflicting views from different branches. 83 If a court
whether to grant hearings to parties filing petitions to deny the license renewals of radio
or television stations. See, for example, the table in ACCESS, Feb. 9, 1976, at 20-21. This
is rather anomalous in light of the fact that licenses have a duration of only three years.
78. For example, in 1972 the Civil Service Commission changed the name of federal
presiding officers from "hearing examiner" to "administrative law judge" in most cases.
79. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.201 et seq. (1975).
80. See, e.g., Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 390·94
(1973) (Burger & Blackmun, n., dissenting). See also Comment, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV.
593, 602 (1963).
81. 2 COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF lliE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, GENERAL MANAGEMENT OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH, INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 4 (1949).
82. See Schwartz, Primary Jurisdiction, supra note 14, at 507.
83. These criteria are among those listed in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962), and still appear to be as definite an exposition of the political question doctrine
as is likely to exist.
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ignores an agency's regulatory scheme, it creates a conflict directly with
the agency and only indirectly with the ultimate source of power, Con.gress or the Executive. The real danger of conflict thus arises only
when a court flouts an agency policy which has been mandated affirmatively by either a congressional act or an executive order. Since many
agency enabling statutes are no more specific than "the public interest,"S4 this type of conflict seems quite rare.
Moreover, experience in the enforcement of the antitrust laws reflects
a long tradition of using diverse parties as well as forums to effectuate
national policy. Here the Justice Department, the FTC, or private
parties may be complainants, and the forum may be a federal district
court or the FTC. The existence of three potential plaintiffs and two
potential forums has not created many confusing or inconsistent results.
Rather, this diversity appears to promote more effective enforcement of
the laws.
Different parties and forums have different concerns, for
example, a private party and the Department. Only in very rare instances must courts thus be concerned that their actions will create a
serious conflict with another branch.
A fifth possible justification for judicial deference is to reduce the
federal courts' already overloaded docket. Courts may invoke agency
jurisdiction for reasons similar to those behind requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies. 85 This approach seems not only shortsighted,
but also unproductive. The real source of overcrowded dockets today is
diversity jurisdiction. 86 Transferring cases from courts to agencies thus
can have only a very minimal impact on the judicial docket--especially
where potential judicial review of administrative action exists. Finally,
administrative cases raise inherently federal questions; accordingly, they
should receive more favorable treatment than diversity cases.
Still another rationale for agency jurisdiction might be that agencies
are presumably more democratic than courts because they report directly to elected officials in the Congress or the Executive. Although
agencies probably are more responsive than courts to the public's will,
the distinction is one of degree rather than kind. After all, the Executive has the initiative in nominating all federal judges, and the Congress
has the final power in confirming them. Pragmatically, both courts and
agencies are insulated to varying degrees from direct popular pressure,
since neither is subject to direct elections-an obviously desirable situa·
tion in adjudicatory matters. Nevertheless, the greater isolation of the
courts militates toward expanding, rather than contracting, their role in
adjudicatory matters. 87
84. E.g., 47 u.s.C. §§ 307(a), 309(a) (1970).
85. See Public Uti\' Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539 (1958).
86. For a proposal simply to abolish diversity jurisdiction, see H. FRIENDLY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 139 (1973).
87. Indeed, this separation of adjudicatory and policymaking functions is precisely
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A seventh and final justification for agency jurisdiction goes to remedial power in two ways:, first, that agencies are more competent than
courts in fashioning relief for broad classes, and second, that the legal
system cannot tolerate different results from different forums. The
question of agency competence in remedial matters rests upon basically
the same assumptions as the "expertise" rationale discussed above. 88
These considerations are just as questionable in this context. Moreover,
the courts have developed increasingly flexible powers since Abilene. s9
As the Supreme Court itself has noted,90 the availability of Supreme
Court review prevents wildly varying lower federal court standards. As
with the expertise justification, a court therefore should not defer unless
an agency shows that it is peculiarly qualified to administer relief in a
particular case.
The second part of this justification-the danger of inconsistent
results by courts and agencies-is also subject to question. The amount
of inconsistency might be extremely small and easily tolerated, D1 and in
at least some instances the legal system already does accept different
results by courts and agencies. 92 To be sure, conflict between agency
and court decisions should be minimized. In some situations, however,
a court may act without danger of real conflict even though an agency
has acted or may act.
A court should be free to award damages where an agency can give
only prospective relief. 93 A court should also be free to impose liability
for conduct which an agency has not immunized or has not immunized
retrospectively. 94 In both cases, court action is necessary to insure a
complete and adequate remedy for the plaintiff. Although a court's
award of damages would conflict in principle with an agency's grant of
what former CAB Chairman Hector, as well as many other commentators, urged. See
Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commission, 69 YALE.
L.J. 931, 953-57 (1969).
88. See text accompanying notes 66-73 supra.
89. Note the example of class actions, as discussed at notes 15, 16 and accompanying text, supra.
90. Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 290-91 (1922).
91. Convisser, supra note 14, at 325, argues that there is no inherent reason why
inconsistent court and agency judgments could not peacefully co-exist, and that the actual
chance of inconsistency is comparatively small.
92. See Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HARV. L.
REV. 529, 549-50 (1963). As Sovern aptly points out, the NLRB and the federal courts
often decide similar issues as to employees' rights.
93. In Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199, 213-18
(D.N.J. 1951), the court held that it could award treble damages in an antitrust suit,
since the CAB could not act retrospectively.
94. In Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conf., 383 U.S. 213, 220-22 (1966), the
Court held that although a case had to be referred to the Federal Maritime Commission
for an initial decision, a grant of immunity would not be retroactive and that the district
court should retain jurisdiction to adjudicate any antitrust violations occurring before the
Board's immunization.
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immunity, a finn cannot reasonably expect immunity until it has secured
all necessary fonnal authorization. 95 Finally, a court should maintain
jurisdiction where agency action is speculative for any reason-for
example, where the agency may decide not to act,96 the agency may lack
an appropriate procedure,97 or the agency is involved in general rulemaking on the sUbject. 9s Indeed, courts should separate out administrative questions and retain jurisdiction over judicial issues as well as
ultimate relief. 99 A court thus should require an agency to show
specific areas of potential conflict among remedies.
In utilizing these seven possible considerations, a court must use a
procedurally fair means to develop necessary data. As will be discussed
later,100 a court should request an agency to give detailed and specific
reasons as to why it should have jurisdiction. A court also should
insure that all interested parties know of any agency recommendation
and receive a full opportunity to comment on it.
These general considerations as to judicial deference are complex and
often divergent. It simply is impossible to create any simple checklist to
guide courts, agencies, or parties. Nevertheless, courts should retreat
from their sometimes blind adherence to general precepts like "expertise" and "uniformity." Rather, courts should make a detailed and
independent inquiry into each factor's applicability.
B.

Specific Situations in Which Judicial
Action may not be Appropriate

As noted at the beginning of this Section, a court's decision to defer
should be based not only on the general considerations of court/ agency
relations, but also on the specific situation before the court. Although it
is impossible to create pigeonholes, it nevertheless is useful to distinguish
some of the most common-and commonly confused-situations. The
95. For a discussion of whether a finn actually must have secured approval from an
agency in order to be immunized, see text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
96. In Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), the Court thus
noted that any conflict between an injunction to interconnect gas lines and a possible
future FPC order would be decided "as, if, and when the Commission denies the
interconnection and the District Court nevertheless undertakes to direct it." [d. at 377.
See also World Airways, Inc. v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 349 F.2d 1007, 1011 (1st Cir.
1965).
97. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397,405-06 (1970); Local 139, Amalgamated
Meat CUtter & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 687 (1965).
98. E.g., Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527, 544-46 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
rev'd 44 U.S.L.W. 4803 (1976). The court of appeals there emphasized the fact, however, that plaintiff's general interests already were well represented in the rulemaking
proceeding. Presumably if a party did not have such effective representation, a court
would be less willing to defer.
99. This is generally the case with true primary jurisdiction. See text surrounding
note 122 infra.
100. See text accompanying note 159 infra.
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following analysis thus categorizes situations on the basis of the type of
jurisdictional issue involved.
1.

Judicial Interpretation of Statutory Exemptions

The most common and convenient method of removing judicial jurisdiction is simply a statute barring actions against an industry or group of
industries. This situation arises most frequently in the context of the
antitrust laws, since treble damages or divestiture have the greatest
potential impact upon the industries which federal agencies regulate.
To be sure, statutory exemptions exist for causes of action other than
antitrust violations. But precisely because of the antitrust laws' potential impact,10l most exemptions focus on the antitrust laws. l02
Because of the powerful policy forces at work, any analysis of statutory exemptions must employ broad standards. First, the clarity of an
exemption's language is obviously important. Although courts always
have been ingenious at twisting statutory language to make sense,
statutes can nevertheless compel irrational results if clearly expressed.
Certainly, the Court has given lip-service to a presumption against
implied repeals ever since Abilene. los But at the same time, under the
"pervasive regulation" theory,104 it has been willing to imply repeals
quite readily. Although a court should honor the clear intent of a
coordinate branch, it need not display absolute fealty. Where a statutory provision is at all ambiguous, a court should construe it against the
drafter. 105
Assuming that statutory language leaves room for judicial construction, as it practically always does, a second consideration should be the
potentially detrimental impact of the challenged conduct. In considering this question, however, a court should look not to the general
activity of the firm or industry in question, but rather to the particular
conduct at issue. As the Court itself has recognized,106 a statute
sometimes immunizes an organization's existence but not all its activities. In examining the potential harm of challenged conduct, a court
should attempt to pinpoint the precise danger to consumers, other firms,
and overall social interests, such as the introduction or promotion of new
technology. A court should be particularly sensitive to any possibility
that conduct will reduce the number of firms in a field, in light of the
101. See United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188,199-200 (1939).
102. Walden, Antitrust in the Positive State, 41 TEXAS L. REv. 741, 767-88 (1963).
103. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 437 (1907).
104. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
105. See generally Schwartz, Legal Restriction, supra note 28, at 437.
106. In Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Association v. United States, 362 U.S.
458, 466-70 (1960), the Court held that although the Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 291 (1972), allowed agricultural producers to form otherwise illegal trade associations, it did not authorize them to engage in other illegal activities.
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national commitment to preservation of atomistic industries. 107 Moreover, a court should examine not just the potential dangers, but also the
past activities of a firm or industry. Although conduct may seem
comparatively innocuous, a page of history may show that it has been
used improperly in the past.
On the other hand, a third consideration in a court's assessment of the
applicability of a statutory exemption is whether the allegedly illegal
conduct is essential to some supervening public interest. Manufacturers
may need to be free to exchange price information about anti-pollution
equipment, for example, in order to expedite adoption of more effective
devices;108 or mergers of competing railroads may be essential in order
to guarantee efficient service. 109 Although the antitrust laws are organic in nature, a more recently expressed public policy can override them.
And in attempting to establish a particular conduct's potential benefits
as well as detriments, a court should not just make predictions. Once
again, it should examine any available data on past experience with the
industry and the conduct. If a firm or industry has abused its exempt
status in the past, a court should be hesitant to extend an exemption.
Another consideration is whether any agency has jurisdiction over the
firm or industry in question. Congress often cre'ates a new regulatory
agency or vests new jurisdiction in an existing agency at the same time
that it grants a statutory exemption. And although an agency's standards probably will differ from those of the antitrust laws, an agency
nevertheless offers some protection to the public interest. The mere
existence of an agency, however, does not militate in favor of an
exemption. A court should examine an agency's power and willingness
to enforce its version of the public interest. Although this inquiry
requires examination of an agency's policies and attitudes, some courts
have done SO.110 A court thus should deal not with generalities, but
rather with the experience of the agency.
2.

Immunization of Conduct Through Agency Approval

Because agency immunizations are similar to statutory exemptions,111
most of the considerations relevant to the latter also apply to the former.
107. The leading case for this proposition, of course, is Brown >Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). But since Brown the Court has expanded the scope of this
policy even further, by preventing conglomerate mergers or mergers of even vaguely
potential competitors. See FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 563 (1967).
108. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST 319-20 (1974).
109. See Phillips, Railroad Mergers: Competition, Monopoly, and Antitrust, 19
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 14 et seq. (1962).
110. See, e.g., United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 20507 (1945); McCleneghan v. Union Stock Yards Co., 298 F.2d 659, 669-70 (8th Cir.
1962).
111. See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.
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A court therefore must parse the language of an agency's enabling
statute in order to determine whether the agency has immunization
power in the first place. There is clearly little benefit in allowing an
agency to order immunization if the agency lacks the necessary power in
the first place. And in deciding whether an agency has immunization
power, a court also should consider the other factors relevant to statutory exemptions-i.e., impact of the conduct, social need for the conduct,
and competence of the agency to police the public interest. A court
should weigh overall benefit and detriment just as in the statutory
exemption situation. In both cases, freedom from liability is the result
of a theoretically reasoned and open legislative process. To be sure,
agencies may devote more study to their decisions and may be subject to
less pressure. These differences are not only impossible to document,
however, but also are probably de minimis. On the other hand, many
judges are quite aware when an agency has been "captured,"112 and in
such cases a court obviously may scrutinize an immunization rather
closely.
Even if an agency has the authority to immunize the challenged
conduct, a firm should be ex,pected to make a reasonable attempt to
secure the agency's formal approval. Both courts and commentators
are divided over this question. Some maintain that a firm must have
received approval, while others feel that an agency should be free to
grant retroactive immunity.11II Although each position has merit, there
is a middle ground: holding firms to a "reasonable corporation" standard. A court thus should require a firm to have secured formal agency
action where a firm knew or should have known that it needed to apply
for approval. A court thus might excuse a small firm which has limited
legal resources and operates in an unclear area of the law, while it might
impose a far stricter standard on a large corporation with house counsel.
As with statutory exemptions, agency immunizations raise a number
of highly complex questions. No definitive guide exists for courts,
agencies, or parties. Nevertheless, a court can add to the rationality of
the decisionmaking process by scrutinizing the reason for an agency's or
firm's action.
3.

Primary Exclusive Jurisdiction

Under primary exclusive jurisdiction, a court has no power to try a
case and an agency has the only authority to make an initial decision.
The courts thus can intervene only on judicial review-an obviously
limited role. Moreover, primary exclusive jurisdiction allows an agency
to apply its own statutory standards, which may differ radically from
112. See text accompanying notes 71, 72 supra.
113. See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
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common law or other statutory law. This is particularly true in antitrust cases, since an agency's last concern usually is to enforce competition among the firms which it regulates. To the extent that administrative and judicial legal standards differ, primary exclusive jurisdiction
deprives a plaintiff of rights just as effectively as a statutory exemption
or an agency immunization. 11 • The only difference-and one of cold
comfort to potential plaintiffs-is that the agency theoretically must
consider initiating a proceeding. All too often, however, the agency's
remedy is ei,the,r functionally inadequate or merely prospective.
Thus, a court should first consider the impact of an agency's legal
standards on the parties. As noted before,115 a party effectively may
lose all rights by being shunted into an agency. Since this amounts to a
de facto negation of major statutory rights, it should not be taken
lightly. WI Therefore, a court should request an agency to show the
precise legal standards applicable to a case. A court should not seek an
advisory opinion on the merits of a case. But it may request an agency
to set forth the applicable precedents or regulations before deciding to
refer a case or issue.
Similarly, a court should consider the effect of an agency's capacity to
give an effective remedy. Even if an agency applies the same legal test
as a court, its inability to give an adequate remedy may effectively
negate a party's rights. A court thus should inquire into the amount,
type, and practicality of agency relief. A court should not send a
plaintiff seeking damages to an agency which cannot award them.1l7
Similarly, a party should not be forced into an agency which can award
only prospective equitable relief where other relief is sought. ll8 And
finally, a court should examine the feasibility of potential agency relief.
Although an agency theoretically may have sufficient power, as a practical matter it may be unable to act. 119 And even if an agency has
appropriate remedial powers, it simply may invoke its discretion not to
use them. Again, therefore, a court should scrutinize an agency's
willingness as well as capability to enforce its mandate.
A third and countervailing consideration, however, is the possible
social value of the challenged conduct. As in the case of statutory
114. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
115. See note 28 and text surrounding notes 49, 50 supra.
116. Schwartz implies that primary exclusive jurisdiction is appropriate only where
the agency would apply the same law as the court. Ct. Schwartz, Primary lurisdiction,
supra note 14, at 499.
117. C/. Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 162 (1922).
118. See Schwartz, Primary lurisdiction, supra note 14, at 509.
119. See Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 327-30
(1963) (Brennan & Warren, n., dissenting). The dissent criticized the C'.ourt for
ignoring the CAB's pleas that it simply could not enforce divestiture adequately through
cease and desist orders.
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exemptions,120 some supervening public interest may justify agency
immunization. If this type of social value can justify negation of legal
rights, presumably it also can justify limitation of such rights by forcing
a party into an agency.
Finally, a court should consider the scope of judicial review on a
possible appeal from agency action. A broad scope of review makes
primary exclusive jurisdiction far more tolerable. It allows a reviewing
court partially to correct the pro-industry biases of a "captured" agency,
even though the reviewing court cannot award relief as completely as a
trial court. A trial court obviously cannot be sure that another court
will apply incisive review. But as courts become increasingly aware of
how an agency actually operates,121 they can at least make an educated
guess as to a reviewing court's attitude.
4.

Primary Jurisdiction

Under true primary jurisdiction, the court retains jurisdiction to render the ultimate decision as well as relief, refers one or more issues to the
agency, and then takes the agency's action for what it deems it is
worth. 122 Although true primary jurisdiction has existed for decades, a
vital fea-ture still is unclear-namely, the extent of a court's freedom to
ignore an agency's decision. A court theoretically should be able to
treat an agency decision merely as an advisory opinion, since the agency's role in many ways resembles that of a referee. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court appears to require the same substantial evidence rule as
on judicial review. 123 Since the Court presumably has reasons similar
to those behind the substantial evidence rule, such as not interfering
with another body's factfinding, a court might be able to preserve broad
review powers by requesting the agency merely to render a legal opinion, not to make findings of fact. This approach might convert the
review into one of law, in which a court has great latitude. 124
The first and most vital consideration in a primary jurisdiction situation is the relevance to the case of the issue which the court is considering whether to refer. The less relevant an issue, the less is the need for
referral. Although the courts have developed virtually no standards for
determining when an issue requires referral, a court should nevertheless
examine an issue's relation to the disposition of the case. What seems at
first glance to be a major question may on 'analysis tum out to be
120. See text accompanying notes 108, 109 supra.
121. See note 110 and accompanying text supra.
122. >See text accompanying notes 51·58 supra.
123. Cf, General Am. Tank Car Corp. v. EI Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422,
432-33 (1940). See also Locust Cartage Co. v. Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc., 430
F.2d 334, 341 (1st Cir. 1970).
124. See Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. Shannon, 377 U.S. 311 (1964).
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comparatively minor or separable. And since referral delays litigation,
a court should not entertain any broad presumption in its favor. Rather, a court must make this determination, on the basis of its own
expertise. Since courts are experts in analysis of causes of action, only a
court should determine the relevance of a particular issue. Accordingly,
an agency has virtually no role to play in this decision.
A court also should weigh the need for expertise in deciding an issue,
regardless of the issue's alleged relevance or irrelevance. Where an
issue is within a court's traditional competence-e.g., construing statutory language or settling controverted factual issues-a court should feel
comparatively free to retain jurisdiction. And courts obviously have
special competence in deciding issues of fundamental rights, such as the
adequacy of a hearing. 125
Furthermore, a court should consider its ability to review the agency
action after a referral. A court should consider structuring a referral so
that the court can review any agency decision as a question of law. To
the extent that a court is able to assure itself a broad scope of future
review, it can feel somewhat freer in referring an issue.
Finally, a court must be sure that an agency will render its opinion
speedily and fairly. Since a referral delays litigation, a court should
require an agency to assure speedy action. Similarly, a court should
require an agency to demonstrate that its decisionmaking process provides adequate procedural safeguards.
True primary jurisdiction thus can be a highly effective mechanism
for coordinating the skills of courts and agencies. If properly structured, a referral can draw on agency expertise and yet not impair
judicial jurisdiction. Precisely for these reasons, courts should have an
operational bias in favor of true primary-as opposed to primary exclusive-jurisdiction. Unless both statutory and policy considerations
mandate a finding of primary exclusive jurjsdiction, a court should
resolve any ambiguity in favor of true primary jurisdiction.
Jurisdictional issues thus are sufficiently complex to defy the creation
of a laundry list of relevant factors. Nevertheless, it is possible to
separate out some issues and considerations. To be sure, the above
factors are general in nature and will not yield facile decisionmaking.
Nevertheless, by considering the general nature of court-agency relations
and the specific nature of such situations, the relevant considerations at
least may become more visible and structured.
125. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 361-65 (1963);
Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. American Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935, 941-43 (5th Cir.
1971), eert. denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972).
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CURRENT ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE
AND POSSIBLE REFORM

As noted at the beginning, many commentators have done excellent
analyses of the cases on "primary jurisdiction," but few have explored
the pragmatic implications for agencies. Accordingly, an examination
of actual agency practices appears in order-even through the quasiempirical means of interviews with prominent agency legal staff members. 126
At any given time, any federal agency probably is involved in comparatively few jurisdictional issues. Indeed, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission reported that it had never encountered a jurisdictional
issue. Most complainants apparently attack NRC licensees by filing a
complaint with the Commission and appealing any adverse agency
action. 121 Other agencies indicated that they handled perhaps one or
two jurisdictional questions per year. 128 Accordingly, these doctrines
apparently operate on a very individualized and ad hoc basis. A court
will deal with anyone agency very infrequently, thus preventing development of judicial expertise. As noted in Section II, a court therefore
must take' care to elicit the details of an agency's regulatory program.
Agencies get notice of potential jurisdictional issues in different ways.
While some have internal procedures for discovering potentially relevant
cases,129 others, such as the FCC,130 learn only from their licensees. The
126. See Appendix for a description of the study.
127. Interview with members of Office of General Counsel, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, in Washingon, D.C., March 4, 1975. This estimate includes cases involving the former Atomic Energy Commission, since the staff members interyiewed simply
had been transferred from one agency to another.
The staff members were somewhat puzzled themselves as to the absence of these
jurisdictional issues, although they frankly said that they never had thought about the
question before. Upon reflection, they decided that the reason for the lack of these
issues probably was that private parties had few if any direct causes of action against
operators of reactors and other nuclear devices. Indeed, all such state remedies may be
preempted under Northern State Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (Sth Cir.
1971), a/I'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1973). And they expressed absolutely no interest in
assuming exclusive jurisdiction, even on the somewhat questionable assumption that the
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5S01 et seq. (Supp. 1976), created
such jurisdiction. They felt that antitrust issues should be iitigated before the federal
courts.
12S. Interview with members of Office of General Counsel, Federal Communications
Commission, in Washington, D.C., October 21, 1974 [hereinafter cited as FCC
Interview]; interview with member of Office of General Counsel, Federal Maritime
Commission, July IS, 1975, in Washington, D.C. [hereinafter cited as FMC Interview].
Interestingly enough, the ICC encounters dozens of jurisdictional issues every year, but
has little trouble in processing them-perhaps precisely because it has lived with the
problem since Abilene in 1907. Interview with member of Office of General Counsel,
Interstate Commerce Commission, July 1, 1975, in Washington, D.C. [hereinafter cited
as ICC Interview]. See text accompanying notes 12-23 supra.
129. SEC Interview, supra note 62.
130. FCC Interview, supra note 12S; FMC Interview, supra note 12S. Neither
commission undertakes an affirmative effort to uncover cases in which it potentially has
exclusive, primary, or preemptive jurisdiction. In fact, very often the first and only
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SEC provides a particularly interesting illustration of internal agency
monitoring. The Office of General Counsel searches appropriate trade
and legal literature for potentially relevant litigation;13l and since the
Division of Corporate Finance naturally reviews all proxy, registration,
and annual statements, it refers to the General Counsel's office any
potentially relevant litigation. 132 The practices of the FCC and SEC
thus differ radically. To a certain extent, this results from the SEC's
greater access to information. At the same time, 'the two agencies
simply differ as to their concern with intervening in relevant private
litigation. ISS
Agencies also differ as to the factors which they consider in deciding
whether to file in a case and assert jurisdiction. Some agencies apparently look to the comparatively abstract policy ques'tion of a case's
potential impact upon their regulatory programs. 134 Other agencies
appear more concerned with the effect of asserting jurisdiction upon
their continuing relationships with courts. lS5
Perhaps more important, procedures for dealing with private litigants
also vary from agency to agency. Some agencies will discuss filing an
amicus brief with one party and never notify the opposing party.IS6
Other agencies either notify both sides that they are considering a
notice of such a case will come in the form of a request for referral or advice from a
state or federal court.
131. SEC Interview, supra note 62.
132. Interview with member of Division of Corporate Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission, in Washington, D.C., December 4, 1974. When the Division
uncovers a potentially interesting case, it either may send a memorandum or simply
"hand-carry the file" to the General Counsel's Office. The Division does not have any
definite guidelines as to what cases may be relevant, but has an apparently effective
"general understanding in the office." [d.
133. Although there is a natural temptation to look for different levels of competence
at different agencies, the difference in concern more likely is the result of the impact of
private litigation. A lawsuit against a single television station has little effect on the
FCC's more than 7,500 broadcast licensees. A lawsuit against the New York Stock
Exchange, however, can affect the nation's entire financial status.
134. The SEC apparently looks to whether a case presents a new and important issue
and whether the court definitely will decide the issue one way or another. It prefers to
avoid "cases with substantial unresolved factual controversies" and to enter as an amicus
at the court of appeals level. SEC Interview, supra note 62. The NLRB is "highly
sensitized to the proposition that there are daily labor proceedings independent of NLRB
jurisdiction" and thus at least will appear in any case with a potential conflict. Interview
with members of Office of General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, in
Washington, D.C., March 4, 1975 [hereinafter cited as NLRB Interview]. One problem
with this approach, a staff member noted, is that in federal district court enforcement of
collective bargaining contracts the General Counsel's Office may be "notified two
minutes before the hearing" and thus have to make a very speedy appearance without
prior presentation to the Board.
135. CAB Interview, supra note 45. On the other hand, the Commission apparently
feels free simply to refuse to file any kind of brief at all, where it feels that the issue is
solely one of law. FCC Interview, supra note 128.
136. FCC Interview, supra note 128; CAB Interview, supra note 45.
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filing,187 or simply refuse to talk to either party after learning about the
litigation. ISS In all agencies, however, there appears to be little or no
contact between private parties and agency members. ISO
The agencies also differ substantially in the extent to which the staffs
consult agency members about asserting jurisdiction. In some agencies,
the staff adopts a position and files a brief without ever consulting the
agency members. Indeed, the agency members may learn of the filing
only when they receive copies of the brief afterward. 140 Other agencies
have informal discussions between staff and members before taking any
position.l 41 Still other agencies make both formal and informal presentations to agency members, depending upon the nature and urgency of
the case. 142
Even though it has approved the filing of a brief, an agency often
must get clearance from the Department of Justice or the Solicitor
General in order to file in some courts. Several agencies reported snarls
137. NLRB Interview, supra note 134. Several staff members indicated that they
were "very scrupulous . . . to get the view of the other side before acting." Very often,
however, they are able to do so simply by means of a telephone call-a simple procedure
which usually satisfies both the agency and the private party.
The ICC has the rather interesting technique of forcing a meeting of all parties, if its
staff decides that a discussion of the merits would be worthwhile. ICC Interview, supra
note 128.
138. SEC Interview, supra note 62. Staff members will not talk with private parties
"beyond the preliminary stage" of investigating the litigation at issue.
139. [d. Both staff and members of the agency attempt to discourage such contacts.
This attitude apparently is unknown at the FCC. FCC Interview, supra note 128.
140. FCC Interview, supra note 128. The General Counsel's Office consults with the
bureau which has primary responsibility for a day-to-day regulation of the' industry in
question. If the General Counsel's Office and a bureau disagree, they then take their
differences to the Commission for ultimate resolution. And the staff always informs the
Commission after a court actually has made a referral. The FPC follows a similar
procedure. Interview with members of Office of General Counsel, Federal Power
Commission, in Washington, D.C., July 15, 1975 [hereinafter cited as FPC Interview].
141. SEC Interview, supra note 62. The staff will circulate a memorandum outlining
the proposed agency position to Commission members before drafting a final brief.
Sometimes the Commission will discuss the issue and sometimes the individual Commissioners simply give their informal approval. The FMC follow a similar pattern. FMC
Interview, supra note 128.
142. NLRB Interview, supra note 134. If the staff of the General Counsel's Office
finds that "time is tight," they will "rush the matter down to the oral agenda of the
Board." If there is not even time for this, the staff will appear in court and assert the
agency's interest in the case, "but not suggest any affirmative position." When the
Board is not sitting as an entity, the staff will attempt to get authorization from three
individual members-a majority of the Board. As one staff member commented, it is
"curiously easy to find three Board members if you really want to." And where time
allows, the staff will circulate a proposed statement to the full Board and have formal
discussion if the Board wants it. One staff member noted that the General Counsel's
Office had considerable discretion for two reasons: first, with more than 300 briefs a
year "the volume of litigation makes it impossible for the Board to review each
carefully"; and second, the Office has grown to "enjoy the confidence of the Board in
very great measure." [d.
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at this point in the process when either the Justice Department or the
Solicitor General disagrees with the agency position. 14S
Aside from the mechanics of filing, it is interesting to note the type of
arguments which agencies make. Some agencies include fairly detailed
discussions of the pragmatic and policy problems which would result if a
court did not grant the agency jurisdiction. 144 This appears highly
useful, since this type of information otherwise may not be available to a
court. On the other hand, some agencies argue general theories of
jurisdiction. 145 This approach appears to be largely an exercise in
futility, since the litigants presumably brief these issues and a court
certainly makes its own legal analysis. Accordingly, the former style of
brief probably is more useful.
As the above review indicates, the agencies have different procedures
for considering and asserting jurisdictional issues. While this· diversity
reinforces the conclusion that jurisdictional decisions must be highly ad
hoc, it also suggests the possibility of procedural reform at the administrative level.
As the "above review also indicates, there are problems in the agencies' treatment of jurisdictional issues. To be sure, the most useful
change would be judicial clarification of the doctrines. In light of the
doctrines' very confused nature, however, this seems unlikely.
On the other hand, there is room for minor but hopefully useful
reforms in the agencies' procedures for dealing with jurisdictional issues.
These changes might enable agencies to interact more effectively with
courts, and improve the flow of information between agencies and
courts, thus producing more reasoned judicial decisions.
First, there should be some system for informing agencies that a
jurisdictional issue has been raised. Agencies thus should use discretionary means to inform courts of their interest in certain jurisdictional
Agencies could use methods as diverse as direct mail,
issues. 146
143. [d. In some cases, the Solicitor General simply will reject the NLRB's position
and either refuse to file a brief or file a brief with the NLRB's position "in a footnote."
And where there is substantial disagreement among several federal agencies, the Solicitor
General may file a brief and allow the NLRB to file a separate brief on its own. See also
FMC Interview, supra note 128. The SEC tries to work with the Justice Department
from the initial decision to file and has experienced some difficulty with the Solicitor
General. SEC Interview, supra note 62. The FCC appears to have had a similar experience. FCC Interview, supra note 128.
144. See, e.g., Brief for CAB as Amicus Curiae at 22-28, Nader v. Allegheny
Airlines, 412 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd 44 U.S.L.W. 4803 (1976); Brief for SEC
as Amicus Curiae at 6-20, Thill v. New York Stock. Exch., 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971).
145. See, e.g., Motion to Intervene for NLRB at 6-9, International Bhd. of Teamsters
V. Ace Enterprises, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 36 (S.D. Cal. 1971); Brief for NLRB as Amicus
Curiae at 11-13, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. R.R. & Motor Coach Employees V.
Lockridge, 404 U.S. 874 (1970).
146. This suggestion ties in closely with the possibility of agency policy statements on
jurisdictional issues. See discussion at text accompanying notes 160-62 infra.
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publication in the Federal Register, statements in legal publications, or
cooperation with bar and judiciary groups. This approach is consistent
with the established view that courts should elicit agency views where
potentially relevant. 147 It is impossible to describe this type of system in
very precise terms, simply because the definition of a relevant jurisdictional issue is so vague. Indeed, two agencies favored this kind of
approach,148 while two opposed it,149 ,thus indicating at least some
agency support.
A second reform would be the creation of a uniform referral system
in primary exclusive or primary jurisdiction cases. As previously noted,150 there currently is a complete absence of standards in this area as
to both the form and content of the referral order. Indeed, there often
is considerable dispute about referring an issue to an agency or simply
dismissing a case outright and allowing the plaintiff to commence
proceedings before an agency. Dismissal seems inappropriate in a true
primary jurisdiction situation.15l But in cases of primary exclusive
jurisdiction, at least some agency staffers prefer an outright dismissal on
the interesting ground that it prevents any mistakes in a possible referral
order.152 Although none of the agencies seemed to have terribly strong
feelings on this point, some staff members did complain about receiving
incoherent or irrelevant referrals. 153
Further, agencies should create internal clearinghouses to monitor
possibly relevant litigation. It obviously is impossible to specify anyone
system for all agencies, since agencies differ not only as to structure and
resources but also as to availability of information. 154 Nevertheless,
agencies should designate staff members to review existing information
and require the industries within their authority to submit more information. None of the agencies felt that this type of system was particularly essential, and one agency actively opposed the idea. m
The fourth, probably most important, and clearly most controversial,
reform is that agencies ban ex parte contacts and allow all affected
147. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1970). See also Kestenbaum,
supra note 4, at 819-20.
148. SEC Interview, supra note 62; FCC Interview, supra note 128. The FCC staff
particularly complained about the difficulty of getting relevant pleadings in a reasonable
amount of time. They thought that better communications would ease this problem,
since courts would understand agencies' needs better.
149. NLRB Interview, supra note 134; CAB Interview, supra note 45. Both sets of
staff members thought such statements would be misunderstood.
150. See text accompanying notes 61, 62 supra.
151. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
152. ICC Interview, supra note 128.
153. ICC Interview, supra note 128; FMC Interview, supra note 128.
154. The very structure of the SEC insures that it receives comprehensive information about litigation activities probably relevant to it. See note 132 and accompanying
text.
1.55. CAB Interview, supra note 45. One staff member simply felt that a clearinghouse was totally unnecessary because the agency already received sufficient notification
from its regulated firms.
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parties to submit written and possibly oral comments before an agency
decides to assert jurisdiction. The plan would require an agency in its
discretion to hold a minature oral argument before making a decision.
This requirement seems only fair in light of the previously discussed
outcome-determinative effect of exclusive or primary jurisdiction156 and
an agency's persuasive weight with a court. After all, if an agency
asserts jurisdiction successfully, it has the same effect upon a plaintiff as
an outright dismissal or at least a stay. Since no court would take such
drastic action without a full hearing, an agency should apply a similar
standard where its influence may bring about the same result. Given
the fact that jurisdictional issues arise quite rarely,157 this requirement
would not impose an undue burden upon agencies. Nevertheless, agency personnel uniformly and bitterly opposed such a requirement. The
typical reactions were that it would create a huge "hassle," add nothing
to the decision process, involve pure questions of law, impinge upon the
agency's litigation strategy, or generally create unnecessary work.H8
None of these reasons seems persuasive, however, in light of the comparative scarcity of jurisdictional issues. It does not seem unreasonable to
ask that an agency spend several hours once or twice a year reading or
listening to arguments which may affect a litigant's right to judicial relief
sometimes running to millions of dollars.
Fifth, the agencies' amicus briefs should address themselves to pragmatic considerations, rather than just the general law of jurisdiction. As
noted,169 some agency briefs give courts absolutely nothing in terms of
the agency's supposed expertise. If an agency indeed has sufficient
expertise to justify jurisdiction, it at least should demonstrate this to a
court in some detail.
Finally, agencies should promulgate general policy statements, outlining the areas in which they believe they have jurisdiction and the
circumstances under which they would assert it. These policy statements would be analogous to the Justice Department's merger guidelines. 16o To be sure, these statements could hardly be any more precise
than are the Justice Department's. Nevertheless, the statements at worst
would let litigants know that an agency might raise a jurisdictional issue,
and at best might give litigants a reasonably accurate forecast of an
agency's position. The agencies did not appear to have any strong
feeling on this subject at all. One agency felt that the statements would
156. See note 28 and text surrounding notes 49, 50 supra.
157. See text accompanying notes 126-28 supra.
158. One staff member rather pithily noted that "regulatory agencies are too goddamned slow as it is," and that a mini-hearing would take "three or six months to do."
FMC Interview, supra note 128.
159. See note 145 and accompanying text supra.
160. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES, 1 CCH Tlw>E REG. REp. 11 4510
( 1968).
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be useless, because of their necessarily general nature.l6l Another
agency thought the statements could be helpful, however, in at least a
limited way.162 Indeed, at least one agency already has taken action
along these lines. In a Statement Concerning Referrals of Private Litigation,163 the Commodity Futures Trading Commission attempted to
outline in general terms the scope of its jurisdiction and the types of
cases in which referral would be worthwhile. Moreover, the Commission invited courts to seek its assistance by way of amicus filings.
CONCLUSION

As noted at the outset, none of these proposals is exactly earthshaking. But the major problems lie in the substantive law, which is not
likely to change in the short term. To the extent that jurisdictional
determinations are somewhat ad hoc, however, better communications
between agency and court will result in better judicial decisionmaking.
The recommendations hopefully would improve these communications.
The law of "primary jurisdiction" has been and still is in a state of
confusion. Precisely because of the partially ad hoc nature of jurisdictional determinations, judicial relief is not likely to materialize in the
near future. Indeed, the Supreme Court's greatest contribution simply
might be to acknowledge the highly individualized nature of its decisions. The proposed considerations discussed in Section II would lead
the courts to undertake more searching inquiries as to the pragmatic
bases for agency jurisdiction in each case, hopefully resulting in more
reasoned, albeit more individualized, judicialdecisionmaking.
The chaotic state of the law has placed the agencies in a difficult
position, as shown by the diversity of methods by which they handle
jurisdictional issues. Since each agency faces only a few jurisdictional
problems at a time, however, no one agency has any particular incentive
to search for better methods of dealing with them. The agencies thus
have responded chaotically to a chaotic situation.
A combination of more rigorous judicial inquiry and more efficient
agency participation would prove highly useful in deciding jurisdictional
issues. To be sure, the proposals for courts in Section II and for
agencies in Section III will not solve the underlying tensions between
regulation and competition, agencies and courts. Nevertheless, they can
go a long way toward easing an admittedly difficult situation.
161. FCC Interview, supra note 128. The staff member felt that policy statements
could not cover the Commission's broad regulatory programs and could not take account
of "unknown jurisdiction." To a certain extent, this feeling also may reflect the FCC's
unhappy past experience with policy statements. See, e.g., Botein, Comparative Broadcast Licensing Procedures and the Rule 0/ Law: A Fuller Investigation, 6 GA. L. REV.
743,751-53 (1972).
162. SEC Interview, supra note 62. The staff member expressed some fear, however,
that overly specific policy statements would lead to inflexibility.
163. 41 Fed. Reg. 1847'1 (1976).
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APPENDIX
METHODOLOGY OF AGENCY INTERVIEWS
From the beginning of the study, it seemed more profitable as well as
more practicable to focus on the interaction between jurisdictional doctrines and administrative procedures. Accordingly, the author decided
that at least a quasi-empirical study of agencies' internal processes was
essential.
As the body of the article indicates, the study was inherently limited
and unscientific. The author originally considered the possibility of
distributing a questionnaire to all counsel in selected cases. The next
step would have been to keypunch the responses, create an appropriate
computer program, and attempt to discover conceptual trends among
agency as well as private attorneys. This approach soon proved to be
unfeasible, however, for two main reasons. First, the complexity of
jurisdictional issues made the drafting of uniform questionnaires virtually impossible. Such a questionnaire would have been so general as to
make the responses useless. On the other hand, tailoring questionnaires
to specific jurisdictional issues or cases would have produced more
detailed, but narrower, data.
Accordingly, the author decided to proceed by means of interviews
with the decisionmaking personnel at each agency. In most cases, of
course, these staff members were in each agency's office of general
counsel. However, in some situations, as at the SEC and FCC, personnel in "line" operating units appeared to share responsibility and therefore also were interviewed.
Since the study obviously did not allow time to interview personnel at
more than four hundred federal agencies, it was necessary to restrict the
size of the sample. Accordingly, the author decided to use the independent regulatory agencies as the sample, for a variety of reasons. First,
these agencies generally have been involved in more jurisdictionallitigation than the executive agencies, simply because most independent
bodies regulate industries where antitrust issues often arise. Second,
these agencies' enabling statutes are at least vaguely similar, since most
of the agencies were created at the same time and followed the model of
the ICC. Finally, the number of independent agencies is small enough
to make a thorough survey of them practicable.
The author initially approached each agency through its representative to the Administrative Conference of the United States. It usually
was necessary to contact a number of busy agency officials in order to
track down the appropriate personnel simply because of the comparative
paucity of jurisdictional litigation. After making contact with the appropriate personnel, the author attempted to prepare for each interview
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by reviewing all Supreme Court and all post World War II lower federal
court cases involving an agency. This preparation usually was of little
help. On the one hand, some staff members were so new that they
could not shed any light on the agency's role in many cases. On the
other hand, more senior personnel understandably tended to have somewhat foggy memories about the policy considerations behind generationold litigation. This experience confirmed the previous decision that
surveying counsel in particular cases would be useless.
Although each interview had a definite set of objectives in terms of
securing information, the author did not present a formal set of questions. Instead, -the author attempted to discuss each agency's general
jurisdictional issues and ask specific questions as seemed appropriate.
This unstructured approach ultimately was quite effective. It not only
elicited fairly candid responses, but produced information about internal
processes which the author previously had not realized might be relevant.
The author usually began an interview by asking agency personnel for
their definition of "primary jurisdiction." This technique established
the common definitional grounds necessary in light of the doctrine's
previously discussed ambiguities. Indeed, almost every staff member
had a different definition. This approach also created a fairly easy
transition into a discussion of the staff members' dealings with the
doctrine, often leading to the surprising conclusion that they actually
cared very little.
This in tum led appropriately into a discussion of the agency's
methods in dealing with jurisdictional issues in litigation. The author
attempted to elicit very specific information, inquiring into staff members' interactions, relations between different offices and commissioners,
procedures for presenting issues to agency members, methods of drafting amicus or other filings, and relations with the Solicitor General as
well as -the Justice Department. Discussion of specific internal procedures also gave the author an opportunity to present some seemingly
useful reforms, such as special information-gathering units, issuance of
policy statements, imposition of ex parte rules, and the like. Staff
members appeared to react to the proposals casually and candidly,
probably because no formal opinions were requested and anonymity was
guaranteed.
After this formal discussion appeared to have produced maximum
useful information, the author ended the interview by suggesting major
reforms. Most importantly, at this point the author recommended that
agencies hold miniature hearings before making any recommendation to
courts. As noted in the article, this suggestion invariably provoked very
negative reactions from agency employees. In fact, this suggestion
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alone often provoked another round of highly productive general discussion.
The interviews varied in length from two to six hours, and follow-up
telephone calls sometimes were necessary to clarify certain points or to
contact previously unavailable staff members. On the whole, however,
agency personnel were cooperative, helpful, and candid.
During the first few interviews the author attempted to interview
between three and five staff members. This number later decreased
radically; the author increasingly found not only that personnel tended
to be repetitive and consistent, but also that some employees resented
the suggestion that any other staff member could add further information. After the interviews at the first half-dozen agencies, the information became increasingly redundant. As indicated in the article, the
agency responses tended to follow two or three separate but similar
lines. Frankly, the author completed the interviews with all agencies
only for the sake of having a full sample.
Although the results of the survey clearly did not rise to the level of
any statistical significance, they nevertheless added a new and important dimension to the study. At the very least, they uncovered the
agencies' general perceptions of and internal procedures for jurisdictional issues. Obviously enough, more interviews and formal questionnaires
would add a new quantum of data. In light of the time and resources
necessary to carry out these studies effectively, however, the benefit
simply did not justify the cost.
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